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(1946- ) 
The forty-second President of the United States, William 
J. Clinton, was the first popularly elected President to be 
impeached by the U.S. HOUSE OF HEI'HESENTATIVES. While 
he will be best known for the events that precipitated his 
IMPEACHMENT (the pmposeful misrepresentation of his af-
fair with a White House intern) , Clinton also played a cIiti-
cal role in redefining the Democratic Party. In paIticular, 
rather than seek to transform the nation through govern-
ment initiatives, Clinton presided over a downsizing of the 
federal government, especially the reach and prestige of 
the presidency. By scaling down expectations of what the 
White House can accomplish and by bluning, if not oblit-
erating, the line separating the personal from the public, 
Clinton will be long remembered. This legacy permeates 
the Clinton presidency, including the ways in which Clin-
ton helped shape constitutional values. 
Born on August 19, 1946, Clinton was raised in Hope 
and then Hot SpIings, Arkansas. After graduating from 
high school in 1964, Clinton attended Georgetown Uni-
versity, Oxford University (as a Rhodes Scholar), and, 
starting in 1970, Yale Law School. Following law school, 
he returned to Arkansas. After a year teaching at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas, Clinton, in 1974, became the Demo-
cratic nominee for Arkansas's Third Congressional 
Dishict. After lOSing a close election, Clinton turned his 
attention to state politics. In 1976, he was elected Attorney 
General of Arkansas. In 1978, at the age of 32, he was 
elected governor of Arkansas. Although failing to win re-
election in 1980, Clinton was reelected in 1982 and served 
as governor from 1982 until his 1993 presidential inau-
guration. 
In October 1991, Clinton annowlced his candidacy for 
President. During his campaign, Clinton was plagued by 
charges of maIital infidelity and dishonesty. In response 
to questions about whether he had smoked mmijuana, for 
example, Clinton at first claimed that he did not violate 
any law and-after admitting that he had smoked mmi-
juana while in England-later argued that he did not in-
hale. Clinton likewise claimed that he did not act 
improperly when, after learning that he would not be 
drafted to selve in the VIETNAM WAH, he reneged on a com-
mihnent to join the National Guard. Nevertheless, Clinton 
persevered, earning his "comeback kid" reputation. Blam-
ing presidential incumbent GEOHGE 1-1. W. BUSH for the high 
unemployment rate and other economic problems, Clin-
ton successfully convinced voters that he would stimulate 
the economy, recommit the presidency to domestic issues, 
and reduce the size of government. Clinton's election, 
moreover, signaled that voters cared most about the ability 
to govern, not moral leadership. 
Thanks to, among other things, a much-improved econ-
omy, Clinton secured the 1996 Democratic Party nomi-
nation without opposition. In the November 1996 
elections, he defeated HepublicaIl Hobert Dole and He-
form Party candidate Hoss Perot. In so doing, Clinton be-
came the first Democratic President to be reelected since 
FHANKLIN D. HOOSEVELT. 
Political expediency, not visionary leadership, was the 
hallmark of the Clinton preSidency. Rather than expend 
political capital on controversial Supreme COUlt nomi-
nees, for example, Clinton embraced easily confirmable 
pragmatic liberals HunI BADEH GINSBURG and STEPHE N G. 
BHEYEH. Likewise, rather than defend the tmconventional 
views of his nominee to the U.S. Department of Justice 
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CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, Lani Gunier, Clinton withdrew the 
nomination. In the end, although sometimes reminding 
the nation that he is especially concerned with constitu-
tional matters because he "used to teach constitutional 
law," Clinton was quite willing to place other agenda items 
ahead of the advancement of some vision of what the Con-
stitution means. One of these agenda items, the use of the 
APPOI NTING POWER "to give you an administration that looks 
and feels like Ametica," proved especially important in the 
nomination of judges and high-ranking officials at the 
Justice Depmtment. 
By down playing the role of ideology in his constitutional 
policymaking, the Clinton administration often took a sit-
uational approach to constitutional matters. This brand of 
PllAGMATlSM ruled the day on questions of CIVIL RI GHTS and 
CIVIL LIBEBTIES. On gay tights, for example, Clinton prom-
ised gay and lesbian leaders that he would "stand with you 
in the sh'uggle for equality for all Ameticans." But that 
promise was only partially fulfilled. While lifting most re-
shictions on federal civilian employment and suppOlting 
LEGISLATION to extend some EMPLOYMENT DISCIUMINATION 
protections to SEXUAL OHIENTATION disctimination, the Clin-
ton adminish'ation neither lifted the ban on gays in the mili-
tm)' nor participated in the Supreme Court litigation, 
HOMEH V. EVA NS (1996), challenging Colorado's exclusion of 
sexual Olientation disctimination from state and local AN-
TIDI SCHTMI NATION LEGISLATION. Clinton, moreover, signed 
the Defense of Maniage Act, legislation condemning SAME-
SEX MAHlUAGE. For Clinton, the moral imperative of full 
equality for gays and lesbians gave way to the political costs 
of siding too often with gay tights interests. 
On AFFTHMATIVE ACTION, political pragmatism likewise 
dominated administration policymaking. At first, the Pres-
ident sounded a cautionary note, launching a government-
wide review of affilmative action by saying that "[w]e 
shouldn't be defending things that we cannot defend." 
Concern that Jesse Jackson would nm for President in 
1996, however, prompted a recalibration of administration 
policymaking. In an effort to shore up its minotity base 
and neutralize Jackson, the Clinton administration em-
braced affirmative action. In pmticular, responding to a 
1995 Supreme Comt decision, ADAHAND CONSTHUCTORS, 
INC. V. PE NA, that called into doubt many federal affilmative 
action programs, Clinton reaffilmed the ptinciple of affir-
mative action by declming that the "job of ending disctim-
ination is not done." More significant, by narrowly 
interpreting the Court's 1995 decision, the Clinton admin-
istration kept in place nearly all federal affilmative action 
programs. 
Through his defense of affirmative action and his oc-
casional support of gay tights , Clinton distanced himself 
fi'om his Republican predecessors, Bush and HONALD BE-
AGAN. Clinton's constitutional politics also vmied from his 
predecessors' on ABOllTION lights. Two ~ays after his .i~­
auguration, Clinton dismantled the pI:o~hfe r~gulato~)' ml-
tiatives of the Reagan and Bush admll1lstratlOns. Clmton, 
moreover, vetoed legislation outlawing pmtial-biIth abor-
tions. Unlike his Republican predecessors, however, Clin-
ton neither made hard-hitting bully pulpit speeches on 
abortion lights nor fOimulated a pro-choice legislative 
agenda. Apparently, with the Court's having reaffirmed a 
woman's light to telminate her pregnancy in I'LANNED PAH-
ENTHOOD V. CASEY (1992), Clinton saw little political gain 
in staking out a hard-line position on abortion. 
Where the White House did stake out hard-line posi-
tions were on legal issues affecting PllESIDENTlAL POWEHS, 
espeCially WAH POWEllS, EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY, and EXECU-
TIVE PIUVILEGE. On war powers, Clinton invoked military 
force on a number of occasions without seeking congres-
sional SUppOit or approval. He sent cmise missiles into 
Afghanistan, ordered air sttikes in Iraq, Bosnia, and Ko-
sovo, conducted milital), operations in Somalia, and 
threatened to invade Haiti. In each case, he pOinted to his 
inherent constitutional power to "command" the milital),-
Indeed, by shiking deals with both the NOith Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UNITED NATIONS, 
Clinton relied more on the sanction of these multinational 
organizations than on the support of Congress. 
On presidential immtmity, the Clinton administration 
unsuccessfully argued before the Comt that sitting Pres-
idents were immune from civil lawsuits. In an earlier de-
cision, the Comt had concluded that a President was 
entitled to absolute immunity from civil lawsuits based on 
his officials duties. In defending a sexual harassment law-
suit filed against the President, CLINTON V. JONES (1997), 
the administration sought to extend this ptinciple to law-
suits based on unofficial actions before he became Presi-
dent. 
On executive ptivilege, the Clinton administration 
sought to expand the scope of presidential ptivileges in 
the face of both congreSSional and Office of Independent 
Counsel investigations of the President. Among other 
things, the administration claimed that the attorney-cli-
ent ptivilege extends to government attorneys working in 
the White House Counsel's office, that U.S. Secret Service 
agents could refuse to appear as witnesses in a climinal 
proceeding concerning presidential activities, and that 
presidential claims of executive privilege extend to plivate 
matters, including communications with White House 
aides about civil lawsuits filed against the President and 
ctiminal investigations. These administration claims were 
rejected by lower federal comts. In a related case, how-
ever, the Supreme Court rejected Office of Independent 
Counsel efforts to subpoena the notes of meetings be-
tween a White House attorney (who had committed sui-
cide) and his plivate counsel. 
CLINTON v. JONES 
This melding of personal and public was also a promi-
nent feature of impeachment proceedings against Clinton. 
Defenders of the President argued that the proceedings 
concerned personal sins (inappropliate sexual relations 
with a White House intern). Clitics of the President 
claimed that the President turned these personal sins into 
public wrongs- lies and misrepresentations before a fed-
eral court judge and a federal CHAND JUHY as well as the 
obsttuction of justice. With most members of Congress 
voting along party lines, a majOlity of the House voted to 
impeach Clinton while the U.S. SENATE did not come close 
to the two-thirds vote necessary to remove him from of-
fice. Most senators, however, did condemn the President 
for his lies, obfuscation, and philandery. 
NEAL DEVINS 
(2000) 
(SEE ALSO: Articles of Impeachment of William J. Clinton.) 
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